Abstract-Being DNS an essential service for Internet reliabil ity, it is an attractive target for malicious users. The constantly increasing Internet traffic rate challenges DNS services and their attack detection methods to handle actual queries while being flooded by tens of millions of malicious requests per second.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well-know that DNS is an Internet critical service. Internet architecture makes high-level services require DNS to identify resources associated to specific domain names.
Out-of-service DNS servers easily yield to partially blackout Internet, and low-performance DNS servers slow down the rest of network activity depending on them. It is then an attractive target to act against Internet resilience, especially at nation-wide context when random qnarnes attacks address a specific country Top Level Domain (TLD) [1] . Moreover, DNS servers have been susceptible to be used as attacking sources, via reflect-and-amplify methods [2] . To that extend, DNS administrators need monitoring tools that help to detect and classify state-of-the-art flooding attacks, and to identify and understand zero-day vulnerabilities.
Also, increasing traffic challenges the current infrastructure, and it is common that detection systems cannot hold the CPU intensive analysis under actual flooding, and even crash before the server they protect does so [3] .
In this paper we study different supports to build a DNS flooding generator. In Section II we describe the state of the art on attacks against DNS and currently identified countermea sures. Considering that flexibility is an important requirement, we have chosen to rely on commodity-hardware and packet dispatching controlled by software. Then, in Section III we study different commodity-hardware network frameworks, and in Section IV, different existing traffic generators relying on them.
In Section V, we describe how we have built a DNS flooding tool based on the MIT-Licensed MoonGen [4] , that focuses on Lua scripting and the underlying Data Plane Development Kit (DPDK) technology. Finally, we evaluate our tool's perfor mance in Section VI.
The developed generator represents the first element on a testbed aimed to analyse countermeasure strategies against DNS flooding attacks. As we describe in the paper, using a single CPU core, this tool is able to saturate a lOGbps link at wire-rate with structured DNS "-'74-byte packets, similar to random qnames flooding or reflect-and-amplify queries.
DNS administrators might use this generator to stress their at tack detection systems and evaluate countermeasure strategies.
French legislation, mainly the 323-3-1 article from the Penal code, makes it legally impossible to openly publish software especially able to act against computer infrastructure, unless legitimate reasons such as research on security. Nevertheless, the DNS protocol support that we were required to create for MoonGen is currently available in its upstream sources.
We invite interested security researchers to contact us to gain access to the full code.
II. STATE OF THE ART ON DNS FLOODING ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES
DNS servers face different kinds of flooding attacks to day. In this paper, we focus on two of the most important: random qnames and reflect-and-amplify. In this section, we characterise them and describe some of the currently identified coun termeasures.
A. Random qnames attack
The Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) random qnames are commonly used to attempt against the availability of au thoritative servers of a specific domain. As its name suggests, the attacker floods the server with queries composed of non existent random prefixes and a fixed domain suffix found under the servers' authority. As it is common in DDoS, this attack requires the offender to control and coordinate a high number of DNS clients able to send packets forging their source IP addresses.
AFNIC reports a random qnames attack on September 4 2014, addressed against the Wallis-et-Futuna's .wf domain, that shares the TLD servers with France [5] . This attack lasted for fourteen hours, reaching a maximum rate of one million requests per second. DNSMON, a DNS active measurement system [6] from the RIPE Atlas network, reports more than 99% unanswered queries from the e. ext. nic.fr server, between 978-1-5090-0304-4/16/$3l.00 ©2016 IEEE11:00 and 13:10, during this attack. Offenders were then able to partially made unavailable one of the AFNIC TLD servers.
Another random qname example is the big attack against the DNS root in NovemberlDecember 2015 [7] . Note also that many DDoS attacks are not discussed or even announced publicly, such as the attack against RIPE-NCC in January 2016, whose technical report made at a DNS-OARC meeting is not public. These attacks could imply unusual packet char acteristics, such as transmission on TCP or IPv6, but packets present the following general pattern. 
B. Rejlect-and-amplify attack
The second type of attack we focus on is reflect-and amplify, whose strategy is to make use of DNS servers to flood a target [2] . In this case, the attacker control several machines, making them to spoof their IP addresses with the victim's and to query a DNS server. Looking to produce from it the largest possible packet answer, it is common that the attacker takes advantage of flaws in the design of the protocol stack and of later extensions. For example, the DNS extension EDNS(O) [8] , defined to overcome the size restrictions of DNS messages when sent over UDP, and that was required to exchange large DNSSEC records. The design of a flexible DNS generator requires to allow the user to set up different packet characteristics, including fixed and varying fields. Although, it should not be limited to the attacks that we have described here, but rather make it easy to take into account other scenarios, packet fields and further DNS extensions.
C. DNS monitoring and measures against jlooding attacks
Besides the common and classic Nagios [9] , there are free software tools that can be used by DNS administrators, such as the Ripe Atlas Network DNSMON [6] , or the components of DNSwitness, DNS delve and DNSmezzo [10] . Despite the existing monitoring tools and standardised best practices, we can affirm that the DDoS problem is not solved yet, and research is still required for implementing tools that prevent making DNS servers unavailable.
III. NxlOGBPs TRAFFIC PROCESSING FRAMEWORKS
We can categorise the existing traffic generators accord ing to their base: hardware appliances, FPGA and software.
Hardware-based devices, such as those produced by Xena, commonly carry out high-speed generation and are highly accurate to control packet rates and timestamping. They are focused on benchmarking according to standard methodolo gies such RFC 2544, RFC 2889 or RFC 3918. Xena also provides scripting interface to control packet generation and capture. However, these devices are not easily affordable given their costs. At their turn, NetFPGA cards are built on open source hardware and software, and are especially designed for research and teaching, being also less expensive than hardware appliances. NetFPGA cards are able to achieve highly-accurate packet generation in terms of rates and inter packet gaps.
Software solutions are based on general-purpose computers and specialized network cards produced by Intel and Melanox, among other providers. Even though these solutions relate to specific hardware, they are more affordable than FPGA based approaches. Software-based solutions depend on the framework that delivers the packets to the hardware interface.
The current version of the standard Linux network framework, the New API (NAPI), is poorly efficient in lOGbps links. The need to provide an alternative has been largely identified by academic and industrial research. Moreno [14] , Gallenmtiller et al. [15] have studied the NAPI's characteristics that create limitations and bottlenecks. Example of such characteristics are per-packet management of resources, serialized access to traffic for further analysis on a single point, among others.
Different network frameworks such as DPDK [16] , HPCAP [17] PFQ [18] , and PF _RING [19] , have been developed to overcome these limits. While they implement different strategies to take advantage of modern network interfaces capabilities, we can find some similarities among them. 
IV. SOF TWARE-BASED TRAFFIC GENERATORS
It is possible to find software-based traffic generators, but we focus here on those especially designed for high perfor mance on 10 Gbps links.
A. General purpose generators
For example, Bonelli et al. designed a generator [20] that, relying on parallelism and a new PF _DIRECT socket for the standard Linux network framework, is able to send 13 million 64-byte packets per second, near to line-rate, and to saturate a 10 Gbps link with 128-byte packets. Concerning PF _RING, the zsend generator is able to achieve line-rate with the zero copy module. But the non-free license limited our tests. As far as we understand, HPCAP lacks a packet generation tool, documentation on how to build it, or a high-level framework that allows to well format packets.
We can find different DPDK-based traffic generators avail able, such as Wind River's pktgen-dpdk [21] , an accelerated version of Ostinato [22] and MoonGen [4] . At the time of this writing, none of them provided support to generate customized DNS queries. Intel's pktgen was designed to run over DPDK.
It is able to send or forward synthetic traffic at NxlOGbps, and it claims that it can be customized via Lua scripts. However, we have been unable to reproduce traffic from script examples included on the source, and documentation lacks information about how to enhance it. At its turn, Ostinato was built over PCAP and it was not designed to produce 10Gbps traffic. However, there have been efforts to adapt it to DPDK.
Ostinato's main particularity is a graphical front-end that aims at making simple to customize the traffic to produce. At the same time, its performance may be impacted by this design choice.
MoonGen is a traffic generator that wraps DPDK and provides network stack control by Lua user scripts. Its authors affirm they designed MoonGen requiring that it should be as flexible as possible, it should be able to saturate lOGbps links with 64-byte packets, and it must control rates and timestamp packets with a high precision level.
From our point of view, the main MoonGen's feature, is that it provides the user with the ability to manage packets via Lua scripts. MoonGen relies on LuaJIT [23] , ajust-in-time A. MoonGen user scripts to generate DNS queries compiler, and its Foreign Function Interface (FFI) library that As described in [4] , MoonGen user scripts require a master makes it possible for Lua to directly interact with DPDK's C function that configures the running environment and then libraries and structures. MoonGen authors chose Lua because spawns slave functions linked to a specific core and port. Snabb Switch [24] have previously demonstrated that it can These slave functions actually create the packets and send the be used to process packets at high rates. MoonGen confirms traffic. MoonGen's Lua scripts run transmission loops at their this, not only achieving full wire-rate on a single lOGbps link, core, which deliver packet buffers to memory space. Thanks but it also rating 178.5 Mpps at 120Gbps thanks to multiple to DPDK, network interfaces directly access those memory cores controlling six dual-port network cards. Depending on spaces, avoiding the overhead produced by the standard net hardware availability, authors claim that it could scale to work framework of Linux, as explained in the previous section. lOOGbE, considering that multiple cores can handle a single
The base of our approach is to take advantage of the port.
MoonGen's ability to format and fill the packets by using MoonGen combines software and hardware-based methods calling functions, when allocating buffers in memory. To to mitigate timing issues and control inter-packet gaps. It also clarify this, the following code snippet provides an example takes advantage of hardware timestamping to measure latency about the function that create memory pools for DNS queries under sub-microsecond precision.
inside the slave function. Authors have also identified some limitations, mainly given I by LuaJIT, which can lead to pause times when collecting 2 garbage. MoonGen disables then the garbage collector for 3 most experiments without risk, because all the packet buffers � are handled by DPDK, making them transparent to user scripts. 6
The lack of a mature and fixed release, detailed docu-7 mentation and stable example scripts could be considered as � 
B. DNS-specific attack generators
It is difficult to find publicly available DNS query generators especially designed to produce flooding attacks. We have been able to evaluate SOP [2] , that focuses on DNS reflect and-amplify attacks. SOP gives to the user the flexibility to generate queries from fixed qnames from static IP addresses I until random qnames from varying sources. It takes into 
V. A FLE XIBLE DNS QUERIES GENERATOR BASED ON

DPDK+MoONGEN
As stated before, we have chosen MoonGen by the flex ibility it provides to control packets generation by high abstraction level Lua scripts. In our case, we needed to design scripts that create attack-equivalent DNS flooding queries, at the maximum possible rate. These scripts require to be easily modifiable to provide the ability to adapt the generator to new or further kind of attacks. In this section we describe how we have structured the scripts, how we have evaluated them and the results we have achieved. In each iteration of this loop, the buffer allocates in memory a burst of packets of the same specified length. Then, it oftloads the checksum calculation to the network interface and finally the hardware queue sends the packet buffer through the port the slave function is linked to.
In the example code snippet listed above, we create packets containing one query and one addition record. One of the most relevant callback functions is in charge of filling the DNS data sections. In this case, the DNS Message Content is affected by the value returned by genBody(), responsible for correctly filling the query and additional record sections.
B. Varying packet fields
A flooding query generator requires to fill packets with highly irregular values to produce a traffic pattern difficult to identify. In Section II, we have listed fields related to the RAM and two Intel network interfaces: a dual SFP+ port X520-DA2 and a dual RJ45 port X520-TA2.
MoonGen requires to reserve a CPU core for the master function. Using the three remaining free cores, our script has been able to saturate three ports in similar conditions between each other, achieving 30Gbps. For synthetic random qnames and reflect-and-amplify query packets, this represents more than 35 million requests per second. Number of random fields per packet 
VI. EVALUATING PERFORMANCE
In this section, we first assess the impact of CPU frequency on performance, comparing how our script performs against two different tools, running at different CPU frequencies.
Then, we evaluate how the number of varying fields affects the performance of our script.
A. Impact of CPU frequency
To evaluate the impact of CPU frequency, we consider the SOP DNS query generator [2] and the MoonGen tx-multi core. lua example script, that generates "empty" packets.
Looking for a "worst case" scenario, we minimized the size of the packets avoiding EDNS additional records, resulting in a 74-byte packets. For SOP and our DNS flooding script, this means patterns of DNS random queries. We configured them to produce queries composed of two labels: an eleven-byte random prefix and a two-byte fixed suffix. While tx-multi core.lua cannot produce DNS queries, but we have modified it to generate packets of the same length than the other tools. Figure 1 
B. Impact of random packets on peiformance
To evaluate how generating fully random packets impacts performance, we have run our script against different numbers of varying fields. Following a similar 74-byte packet structure than the previous evaluation, we have set down CPU frequency to I600Mhz. As Figure 2 shows, variations between generating I-random and lO-random field packets is not substantial. As shown above, differences in performance disappear when CPU frequency is at least 1800Mhz.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have studied different software network frameworks and We consider this generator as a useful tool that helps to evaluate strategies to protect DNS servers. lOGbps-able defense tools are currently needed, so our future work focuses on evaluating the limits of commodity hardware to analyse incoming traffic. While we can identify some similar require ments in tools that generate flood attacks on one side, and tools that detect them on the other, the analysis of traffic addressed to actual DNS servers needs to be highly precise.
DNS servers must guarantee to answer to any request, so protection tools must avoid dropping actual queries. This particular requirement challenges general-purpose hardware and the software it relies on. Further work include evaluating if DPDK+MoonGen is still a sound support or if a capture focused-framework could be more suitable.
